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Abstract
Perceived objects automatically potentiate afforded action. Object affordances also facilitate
perception of such objects, and this occurrence is known as the affordance effect. This study
examined whether object affordances facilitate the initial visual processing stage, or perceptual
entry processes, using the temporal order judgment task. The onset of the graspable (right-
handled) coffee cup was perceived earlier than that of the less graspable (left-handled) cup for
right-handed participants. The affordance effect was eliminated when the coffee cups were
inverted, which presumably conveyed less affordance information. These results suggest that
objects preattentively potentiate the perceptual entry processes in response to their affordances.
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Daily activities involving manual interaction with objects require accurate perception as well
as selection and execution of appropriate actions. According to Gibson (1979), each object
aﬀords speciﬁc actions, such as holding a right-handled coﬀee cup (i.e., a cup whose handle is
on its right side) with the right hand, and such action in turn facilitates further perception of
the object in visual environments. Object aﬀordances can thus shape actions for the active
perception of the object of interest (Gibson, 1979). Previous research has demonstrated that
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object aﬀordances facilitate manual responses (Cho & Proctor, 2010; Pappas, 2014; Tucker &
Ellis, 1998) as well as identiﬁcation of objects (Adamo & Ferber, 2009; McNair & Harris,
2014; Riddoch, Humphreys, Edwards, Baker, & Willson, 2003; Roberts & Humphreys,
2011), which is known as the aﬀordance eﬀect.
For example, Tucker and Ellis (1998) asked participants to judge whether graspable
objects (e.g., a frying pan) were upright or inverted while manipulating the mapping of a
response hand to object (upright-inverted and left–right) orientations factorially. First,
responses to upright objects were generally faster than responses to inverted objects
regardless of their response hand. Second and importantly, although the horizontal left–
right orientation of objects was task irrelevant, responses were faster when they were made
by the aﬀorded hand than the nonaﬀorded hand. These results suggest that object aﬀordance
information automatically triggers relevant motor responses after the registry of the objects
in the visual system (e.g., Adamo & Ferber, 2009; Craft & Simon, 1970; Michaels, 1988;
Tucker & Ellis, 1998; Wallace, 1971).
However, Anderson, Yamagishi, and Karavia (2002) interpreted the aﬀordance eﬀect as a
manifestation of attentional bias toward a salient (sometimes graspable) component within an
object (an attention hypothesis), not from motor codes automatically aﬀorded by a graspable
component (an aﬀordance hypothesis). That said, the aﬀordance hypothesis and attention
hypothesis are not mutually exclusive because the time courses of the eﬀects expected by two
hypotheses can overlap. The aﬀordance eﬀect automatically triggered by aﬀordance
information may arise before attentional bias modulates or overrides the aﬀordance eﬀect.
Supporting this idea, there is mounting evidence that the aﬀordance eﬀect could arise even
without attention (Almeida, Mahon, & Caramazza, 2010; Almeida, Mahon, Nakayama, &
Caramazza, 2008; Fang & He, 2005; Pappas & Mack, 2008; Yamani, Ariga, & Yamada,
2016). For example, Pappas and Mack (2008) reported that even undetected objects during
the attentional blink (e.g., Shapiro, Raymond, & Arnell, 1997) potentiated compatible motor
responses.
In the absence of higher cognitive processes such as attention, object aﬀordances may
boost an otherwise low signal representation of an object for more accurate perception for
action. To explore this possibility, we hypothesized that object aﬀordances facilitate the
initial stage of visual processing, that is, preattentive process, with accelerated early
sensory processing of aﬀording objects. To evaluate this hypothesis, the present
experiment employed a temporal order judgment task with the left- and the right-handled
coﬀee cups as stimuli appearing with various stimulus-onset asynchronies (SOAs). A total of
16 right-handed participants judged the order of the stimulus onsets in an unspeeded manner.
A point of subjective simultaneity (PSS) was computed as a measure of the diﬀerence of
latencies for the perceptual entry of right-handled (more aﬀordance) and left-handled (less
aﬀordance) stimuli.
More speciﬁcally, if object aﬀordances speed early registry of visual information, then we
predict that the onset of the right-handled cup will be perceived earlier than the onset of the
left-handled cup, leading to the negative PSS for the upright cups but the PSS of
approximately 0 for the inverted cups. Default Bayesian tests were used (Rouder &
Morey, 2012), and Bayes factors were used as the measure of evidence for an eﬀect of
interest. Brieﬂy, a Bayes factor indicates a ratio of likelihood that obtained data favor a
statistical model including eﬀects of interest to likelihood excluding the eﬀects. One
advantage of using Bayesian statistical approach over null-hypothesis signiﬁcance tests is
that the Bayesian analysis can provide evidence in favor of the null hypothesis. We report
B10 for Bayes factors and use terminologies for denoting the magnitude of eﬀects as
introduced in Jeﬀreys (1961).
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Results
Using the psigniﬁt program (Fru¨nd, Haenel, & Wichmann, 2011), we calculated PSS by
ﬁtting a logistic function to the observational data and the data were analyzed using JASP
(jasp-stats.org). The data consisted of the proportion of the trials wherein each participant
judged the right-handled image to be presented ﬁrst in each of the SOA conditions. The mean
PSSs across participants for each upright and inverted condition are shown in Figure 1.
Negative PSS values indicate that the right-handled image had to be presented later than
the left-handled image in order for the two images to be perceived as appearing
simultaneously; in other words, when the two images were presented simultaneously, the
onset of the right-handled image was perceived earlier than the onset of the left-handled
image. The data indicate very strong evidence that the PSS value in the upright condition was
smaller than 0, one-sample t(15)¼ 4.42, B10¼ 70.08; the onset of the right-handled cup was
perceived earlier than the onset of the left-handled cup. On the other hand, the data provide
moderate evidence that the PSS in the inverted condition favored the null 0, one-sample
t(15)¼ .39, B10¼ 1/3.70; perceived onsets of the two cups were not diﬀerent.
Consistent with the pattern of Figure 1, 93.75% of participants showed the negative PSS
values in the upright condition, whereas in the inverted condition, 56.25% of participants
showed the negative PSS values.
Figure 1. The visual stimuli and the results of the experiment. Negative PSS values indicate that the onset of
the right-handled image (b, d) was perceived earlier than the onset of the left-handled image (a, c) even
though the two images were presented simultaneously. Error bars denote between-subject 95% confidence
intervals.
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Discussion
As expected, the onset of the right-handled stimuli was perceived earlier than that of the left-
handled stimuli by 5.41ms on average. Interestingly, this eﬀect was observed only when the
image was presented upright and the eﬀect was eliminated with the inverted images that
convey less aﬀordance information, consistent with our prediction. Apparently, these
results cannot be explained only by the attention hypothesis (Anderson et al., 2002), rather
they are in favor of the aﬀordance hypothesis, oﬀering novel evidence concerning the
aﬀordance eﬀect at the initial visual processing stage, or accelerated sensory processing
(Shore, Spence, & Klein, 2001; Spence & Parise, 2010) of aﬀordance objects.
One may argue that the present results are due to familiarity: Because right-handed
participants presumably use right-handled cups more frequently than left-handled cups,
visual experience with such visual projections might facilitate the perceptual entry of
familiar objects. However, previous visual search study (Yamani et al., 2016) with the
stimuli identical to those used in the present study (a right-handled target among left-
handled distractors or vice versa) demonstrated the absence of a search asymmetry, for
which the visual familiarity diﬀerence between a target and distractors is responsible
(Rauschenberger & Yantis, 2006). Therefore, it is unlikely that visual familiarity of the
right- and left-handled cup stimuli used in this study diﬀers and is directly responsible for
the eﬀects reported here.
A number of studies have demonstrated the robustness of the aﬀordance eﬀect in that
merely viewing depicted objects potentiates actions associated with them even though they
are smaller than the actual objects (Cho & Proctor, 2010; McNair & Harris, 2014) or even
though they lack in-depth information (Pappas & Mack, 2008; Pellicano, Iani, Borghi,
Rubichi, & Nicoletti, 2010). Previous research further demonstrated that the eﬀect occurs
even for imaginary objects (Derbyshire, Ellis, & Tucker, 2006). That said, given the facts that
an image is far from the actual object in many properties (e.g., size, color, texture, and
background context) and that realistic representations of objects play an important role in
producing the aﬀordance eﬀect (Pappas, 2014), our current results might underestimate the
aﬀordance eﬀect; this might a bit lower the Bayes factor in this study.
According to Adamo and Ferber (2009), an object stimulus (e.g., a nail) can remain
detectable during the attentional blink (e.g., Shapiro et al., 1997) when an action-related
tool (e.g., a hammer) precedes the onset of the stimulus. They propose that object
representations of the tool automatically trigger object aﬀordances within the dorsal
stream of visual processing (action pathway; Goodale & Milner, 1992) and that they
facilitate other action-related objects to reach awareness. Interestingly, our ﬁndings showed
that preattentively detected object aﬀordances can recurrently facilitate their own object
representations to gain faster access to awareness. Further investigations are warranted
with regard to this issue.
In sum, object aﬀordances are preattentively detected, in turn facilitating to form object
representations by accelerating the perceptual entry processes, which may be the very
foundation of the aﬀordance eﬀect.
Method
A total of 16 right-handed participants (nine male; mean age¼ 24.00 years; mean laterality
index¼ .87.22, SD¼ 15.94, Oldﬁeld, 1971) were recruited from the community of Kyushu
University. All reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They received 500 Japanese
Yen for their participation.
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The stimulus pair consisted of either of upright (Figure 1(a) and (b)) or inverted images
(Figure 1(c) and (d)), which was manipulated between blocks. They were presented on a 22-
in. CRT display (RDF221S; Mitsubishi, Japan). The resolution of the display was 1024 768
pixels and refresh rate was 100Hz. Presenting stimuli and collecting data were computer-
controlled (Mac Pro; Apple, USA). We used MATLAB with Psychtoolbox extension
(Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) to generate stimuli. The visual distance was 57 cm.
Participants began each trial by pressing a space bar. After the delay of a random duration
between 500 and 1500ms, a pair of stimuli, that is, left- and right-handled coﬀee cups (8.6 by
10.9 each), was presented on a white background with one of the variable SOAs (70, 30,
10, 0, þ10, þ30, þ70ms). The stimuli were aligned vertically and separated by 11.7 above
and below the central ﬁxation. The stimulus position where each cup was presented (top or
bottom) was randomized. The stimuli remained on screen until a response was given. Each
stimulus pair was oriented in an upright or inverted manner (Figure 1), which was
manipulated between blocks. The participants were asked to perform a two-alternative
forced-choice task in which they decided which stimulus appeared ﬁrst by pressing either
the up or down key with their right hand. Quick responses were not encouraged. No feedback
on the response accuracy was provided to the participants. The experiment consisted of two
blocks, the order of which (upright ﬁrst or inverted ﬁrst) was counterbalanced across
participants. Each experimental block consisted of 280 trials (2 stimulus positions
7 SOAs 20 repetitions) in a randomized order between participants. The participants
performed a total of 560 trials, and the experiment took approximately 20min.
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